{"id":3430888,"date":"2026-01-07T13:20:25","date_gmt":"2026-01-07T11:20:25","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/nhub.news\/?p=3430888"},"modified":"2026-01-08T09:03:25","modified_gmt":"2026-01-08T07:03:25","slug":"breitbart-business-digest-why-own-greenland-when-we-can-lease-it","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/nhub.news\/fr\/2026\/01\/breitbart-business-digest-why-own-greenland-when-we-can-lease-it\/","title":{"rendered":"Breitbart Business Digest: Why Own Greenland When We Can Lease It?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p style=\"text-align: justify;\"><b>What\u2019s the best structure for securing American interests on the world\u2019s largest island?<\/b><br \/>\nHow Trump Can \u2018Acquire\u2019 Greenland Without Buying or Seizing It<br \/>President Trump\u2019s intervention in Venezuela has somehow sparked renewed interest in the administration\u2019s Greenland ambitions.<br \/>Trump\u2019s critics are decrying imperialism and Denmark thinks there is something rotten about the whole idea of the U.S. entrenching itself in the Atlantic colony of the Danes. Meanwhile, our allies are quietly admitting the strategic case for a stronger American presence in Greenland is obvious.<br \/>But not enough attention has been paid to the practical question: What\u2019s the best structure for securing American interests on the world\u2019s largest island?<br \/>We\u2019re not going to invade Greenland. And annexing or buying Greenland is probably the wrong approach. The United States doesn\u2019t need sovereignty over two million square kilometers of ice and rock. We need durable access: military and space bases, infrastructure, and a clear framework for strategic minerals. Before we get to the better structure, it helps to see why an outright acquisition\u2014either by conquest or purchase\u2014is a suboptimal way to secure our strategic and economic interests in Greenland.Why Greenland Matters<br \/>Greenland sits astride the Arctic approaches that connect the Atlantic and the far North, routes submarines use and militaries plan around. And the U.S. footprint there is not theoretical: Pituffik Space Base (formerly known as the Thule Air Base) anchors missile-warning and space-tracking capabilities that matter precisely because the shortest paths from Eurasia to North America run over the pole.<br \/>Then there\u2019s the resource angle. Beneath Greenland\u2019s ice are significant mineral deposits, including rare-earths\u2014inputs that sit inside everything from consumer electronics to advanced defense systems. China\u2019s dominance in rare-earth supply chains has already shown the West what \u201cgeopolitical leverage\u201d looks like when one country controls a chokepoint input.<br \/>Add in an Arctic that is becoming more navigable, more contested, and more surveilled every year, thanks in part to climate change. The strategic logic is not exotic. The U.S. wants stronger, clearer, longer-duration access than the current arrangement provides.<br \/>The question isn\u2019t whether Greenland matters. The question is what mechanism gets America what it needs without creating bigger problems than it solves.What Would It Cost to Buy Greenland?<br \/>When we wrote about buying Greenland in January 2025, we ran a few valuation frameworks and landed around $300 billion as a plausible purchase price. The simplest version valued Greenland like a high-growth strategic asset: take its roughly $2.4 billion \u201cindependent\u201d GDP (backing out Denmark\u2019s transfer payments) and apply a big multiple to reflect optionality\u2014strategic position plus future mineral potential.<br \/>Other methods gave different numbers. Pricing potentially farmable land at Newfoundland rates pointed to tens of billions rather than hundreds. Historical benchmarks\u2014Alaska and the old post-war chatter about a purchase\u2014gave a sense of what \u201cbig territory, small population\u201d deals looked like in earlier eras.<br \/>And compared to Washington\u2019s fiscal scale, even $300 billion is not unimaginable. The U.S. now spends roughly $1 trillion a year on net interest. Measured against that, the sticker price isn\u2019t the biggest obstacle.The Trouble with \u2018Buying\u2019 Greenland<br \/>Even if you set aside the diplomatic theater\u2014Denmark saying \u201cnot for sale,\u201d headlines screaming \u201ccolonialism\u201d\u2014the purchase runs into structural walls.<br \/>First: consent. Greenland is not a fungible asset Denmark can liquidate. Modern politics makes the point plain: whatever Denmark\u2019s legal sovereignty looks like on paper, Greenland\u2019s people have to consent to any arrangement with legitimacy. A deal that treats Greenland as an object rather than a party is not \u201cbold diplomacy.\u201d It\u2019s fantasy\u2014and it would backfire.<br \/>Second: sovereignty transfers are rare for a reason. Selling territory invites nationalist backlash and poisons alliances. Push hard enough and you don\u2019t just annoy Copenhagen. You give adversaries a wedge to drive through NATO. We don\u2019t want to be fighting against Greenlandian nationalist separatists or pushing patriotic Greenlanders into the arms of Russia or China.<br \/>Third: purchase would drag America into a constitutional and political morass it doesn\u2019t need. If the United States \u201cowns\u201d Greenland, the pressure to clarify political status begins immediately. Statehood? A territory arrangement? Representation? Two senators for a population smaller than a mid-sized U.S. city? Years of argument, lawsuits, and domestic fights\u2014none of which advance the core strategic objectives. Plus, given Greenland\u2019s politics, statehood would more or less guarantee two more Democrat senators and three more Democrats in the House, not exactly something President Trump wants to include in his legacy.<br \/>Fourth: ownership isn\u2019t necessary. The United States doesn\u2019t need to govern Greenlandic domestic or even foreign affairs. It needs long-duration basing and infrastructure rights, a stable legal framework for strategic minerals, and the ability to monitor and secure the Arctic approaches. Those aims are achievable without the baggage of sovereignty.<br \/>And there\u2019s another practical point: even in a hypothetical purchase, the U.S. wouldn\u2019t be \u201cbuying vacant land.\u201d Greenland has residents, institutions, and self-government. That reality makes the purchase model conceptually clumsy. The better approach is to focus on rights\u2014what you can do, where you can do it, and for how long\u2014rather than a deed.The Better Starting Point<br \/>Here\u2019s the irony: Washington already has a legal foothold. The United States operates in Greenland under a longstanding defense framework with Denmark. The problem is not that America has zero access. The problem is that the current structure isn\u2019t designed for the next century\u2019s Arctic\u2014strategic competition, infrastructure, minerals, and persistent presence.<br \/>So, if outright purchase is politically implausible, constitutionally messy, and operationally unnecessary, what\u2019s the alternative?<br \/>Tomorrow, we\u2019ll discuss how a century-scale defense-and-development compact\u2014functionally a lease\u2014could give America what it needs with Greenland\u2019s consent, without the sovereignty trap.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>What\u2019s the best structure for securing American interests on the world\u2019s largest island? How Trump Can \u2018Acquire\u2019 Greenland Without Buying or Seizing ItPresident Trump\u2019s intervention in Venezuela has somehow sparked renewed interest in the administration\u2019s Greenland ambitions.Trump\u2019s critics are decrying imperialism and Denmark thinks there is something rotten about the whole idea of the U.S. [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":3430887,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[113],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/nhub.news\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3430888"}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/nhub.news\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/nhub.news\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/nhub.news\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/nhub.news\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3430888"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"http:\/\/nhub.news\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3430888\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/nhub.news\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/3430887"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/nhub.news\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3430888"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/nhub.news\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3430888"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/nhub.news\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3430888"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}