Missile-defense physics may require interceptors to fly into \u2018the teeth of the Russian early warning net.\u2019<\/b>
\n4:46 PM ET
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4:46 PM ET
If Pyongyang fires a missile at the United States, its most-likely trajectory would take it over the North Pole. A U. S. attempt to shoot down that missile would probably occur within Russian radar space \u2014 and possibly over Russia itself. \u00a0\u201cIt\u2019s something we\u2019re aware of,\u201d Gen. Lori Robinson, who leads both U. S. Northern Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command, or NORAD, said Wednesday. \u201cIt\u2019s something we work our way\u00a0through.\u201d
By year\u2019s end, the U. S. will have deployed 44 ground-based interceptors, or GBIs: 40 at Fort Greeley, Alaska, and four at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. If deterrence fails, those interceptors would be the last line of defense against a North Korean missile. Each incoming ICBM might be met with four or more \u00a0GBIs.
Last week, Joshua Pollack told an audience at the annual Air Force Association conference in Washington D. C. that the most probable intercept route aims the U. S. GBI \u201c into the teeth of the Russian early warning net.\u201d
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The actual route will depend on the incoming missile\u2019s course and speed, and just how quickly the U. S. system can react. Pollack, a professor at Middlebury Studies and editor of Nonproliferation Review, elaborated in a subsequent write up of his presentation. \u201cDefending a West Coast target\u2026means engaging the attacking [reentry vehicle] above the Russian Far East. Yikes.\u201d
Robinson, in her remarks, was more guarded. \u201cWhat you have to do is sit down and go, okay, what is the azimuth\u201d \u2014 the direction of the object in the air from the perspective of the observer. The next question, she said, is: \u201cWhen would be the right time to take the best shot to defend? That\u2019s about all I\u2019ll\u00a0say.\u201d
Cornell University arms researcher George Nelson Lewis offered another possibility, the most effective intercept course might actually engage the enemy missile on its way down, not rising from North Korea over Russia. \u201cThe slower closing speed allows more time for the interceptor to make the maneuvers to hit the target and thus allows less vigorous maneuvers to be made, which can be made more accurately,\u201d Lewis\u00a0said.
But Pollack pointed out that attempting to intercept the missile as early as possible on its flight path increases the odds of hitting it, especially if you have to take a second shot. \u201cTake a West Coast scenario: if Alaska takes a head-on shot, engaging over Siberia, but misses, California might then have a chance before the [re-entry vehicle] gets to its target. But if Alaska shoots later, probably that\u2019s the only\u00a0chance.\u201d
The U. S. uses many different sensors to understand launch factors related to North Korean missiles. In a successful test of the GBI system in May, the Missile Defense Agency used infrared satellites to spot the test missile\u2019s launch plume, then tracked it in flight with sea-based X-band radar, or SBX, and land-based TPY -2 radars.
Russia has been reluctant to\u00a0concede that the Hwasong-14 missile that North Korea tested in July is an actual intercontinental ballistic missile. That suggests that if the U. S. spotted a launch and tried to intercept it, Russia might claim that the U. S. was acting provocatively and not in self-defense. The U. S. has attempted to ward off such claims; the GBI is specifically designed to be distinct from any missile that the United States would use to attack Russia. They don\u2019t even carry an explosive warhead, instead destroying their target the same way a rock knocks a bird out of the sky \u2014 with a combination of mass and velocity. If you\u2019re aiming to destroy anything other than a missile in flight, a GBI is a poor\u00a0weapon.
Thomas Karako, a senior fellow at the international security program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said that U. S. is not \u2014 and should not \u2014 sweat the Russian response to a U. S. GBI launch. \u201cThe Russians, when they are honest, are pretty forthright about the fact that they don\u2019t see this as any serious threat to their deterrent\u2026 You really have to drink the Kool-Aid of Russian propaganda to think that the GBIs in Alaska are a threat to Russia\u2019s strategic\u00a0deterrent.\u201d
But the possibility of penetrating Russian airspace adds an extra complication to the question of how best to defend the United States from a growing North Korean threat \u2014 a threat that occupies more and more of Robinson\u2019s\u00a0time.
North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un has \u201c tested 30 percent more [nuclear weapons] than his father and grandfather combined,\u201d she said at the National Defense Industrial Association\u2019s Women in Defense event. \u00a0\u201cYou look at the speed of that and he\u2019s not afraid to fail in public. We can see a ton of intent\u2026 But I can tell you, as head of Northern Command, I\u2019m confident in our ability to defend the United\u00a0States.\u201d
Robinson made her remarks at National Defense Industrial Association\u2019s Women in Defense\u00a0event.
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