The sequencing problem requires coordination between the U. S., China, and Korea to pressure meaningful steps from Kim.
Last week, U. S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was tasked with the same mission his predecessors failed to achieve: to find a way to sequence concrete North Korean denuclearization steps with corresponding concessions from the United States that reflects security needs of both states. Forecasted by a watered-down joint statement in June, by next week we may know whether North Korea is on its way to being inducted in the nuclear club.
The sequencing problem attempts to narrowly avoid two key risks on opposite sides of a spectrum. For U. S. negotiators, a premature normalization of relations and relaxation of sanctions without corresponding steps towards disarmament risks sliding toward de facto recognition of North Korea as a nuclear power. On the other hand, inflexible demands for a robust pace of denuclearization and a lasting incentive structure for compliance risk dissolving diplomacy and re-surfacing tension.
Kim Jong Un’s strategy will seek to avoid conceding his nuclear assets too early (if ever) and risking both internal and external insecurity. Yet he must demonstrate to Trump and the international community through a declaration, verification, and dismantlement regime his genuine commitment to denuclearization to prevent a return to a hostile U. S. policy.
How can the two parties sequence meaningful steps towards these goals while hedging against their respective risks? It has never been done.
The North Korea policy discord between Roh Moo-hyun and George W. Bush was born from a fundamental disagreement on how to sequence the establishment of a peace regime with concrete steps towards denuclearization. Whereas Roh sought reconciliation with the North as a necessary precursor to denuclearization, Bush regarded peace regime-building talks only as a possible outcome of denuclearization. Bush’s hardline stance elevated pressure on the Kim regime to denuclearize but smothered space for diplomacy.
Although at the current juncture President Moon Jae-in of South Korea has agreed to back the U. S. to conduct nuclear negotiations, this same sequencing pathway must now find the confidence of Kim Jong Un and his benefactor, Xi Jinping.
The June 12 joint statement stated that President Trump “committed to provide security guarantees to the DPRK” and Chairman Kim Jong Un “reaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization.” It is still unknown how both parties plan to materialize these vaguely agreed commitments and many still doubt the two positions are reconcilable. But if they are, it is the temporal dimension of these commitments that remains unspecified yet vital for the two distrusting parties to hedge their risks as they implement the agreement.
Upon multiple visits to China this year Kim has reversed the growing distance between the two leaders since their respective ascents to power in 2011 and 2013. By consolidating the strategic relationship with Xi, Kim now has a backer who also supports his preferred “phased, synchronized” steps toward denuclearization. In contrast, the United States has long demanded that the North quickly relinquish its nuclear assets, fearing a closing window to deny a deliverable ICBM capability but also to avoid prematurely lifting sanctions that would reduce Kim’s incentive to completely denuclearize and amount to de facto recognition of North Korea as a nuclear state.
