Edward Howell writes that Kim has expressed his readiness to meet with the US president again, but has also issued a warning about continuing sanctions
Kim Jong-un’s seventh New Year’s address was marked by visible changes in its format. Kim addressed the nation from a comfortable armchair, overlooked by portraits of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, one way of showing his connection to the North Korean population.
Optics aside, however, the message did not contain many surprises. Importantly, there was a clear message sent to the US, namely that the steps Washington takes in 2019 will be crucial in any development – positive or negative – on the nuclear issue.
Yet the North must also take steps itself, and we must not forget the relationship between Pyongyang and Beijing, one that has not always been amicable, not least in recent years.
The supreme leader affirmed his commitment towards an “independent socialist economy” as part of the five-year development plan put forth in 2016. Reaching out to the 25 million citizens in the DPRK, domestic goals of “relieving the shortage of electricity” and revitalising coal mining, fishing and light industries, would all aid “national prosperity and the people’s well-being.”
Amid the slogans of a socialist nation undergirded by the state ideology of juche (loosely translated as “self-reliance”), the focus on the domestic economy was nothing new. After all, this is part two of the byungjin policy of parallel nuclear and economic development, announced in March 2013, but what about the first?
Pyongyang perceives itself to be a fully fledged nuclear power, a declaration it did not shy away from announcing in April 2018 before the third inter-Korean summit, but also announced in December 2009, after the second nuclear test in May of that year, under Kim Jong-il.
Fast-forward less than 10 years, and in his New Year’s Day address, Kim Jong-un declared that the North “would neither make and test nuclear weapons any longer nor use and proliferate them.” This is an overt pledge – far more overt than Kim has stated previously – but whether this is a true signal of the North’s intentions remains unclear. An established nuclear power does not need to perform ongoing visible tests of its capabilities.
Moreover, while Kim stated how the North had “taken various practical measures” regarding the moratorium on future nuclear testing and production, there was no commitment to cap existing production of nuclear or fissile material.
