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Winning the Irregular World War

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The United States is not currently ready for this irregular fight.
Though it is rarely said out loud, the United States is currently in an irregular world war with its strategic competitors, namely China and Russia. America needs to act now to help prevent and prepare for future conventional great-power wars, which would be devastating to all sides in both blood and treasure.
The Pentagon defines irregular warfare as a “campaign to assure or coerce states or other groups through indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric activities.” What this means, in effect, is activities that fall below the level of traditional armed conflict between nation states. It is an approach to warfare that emphasizes the importance of local partnerships and gaining legitimacy and influence among local populations, rather than clearing or occupying territory. It is also often referred to as “hybrid” or “gray-zone” activities.
U.S. adversaries have historically relied on proxy forces—both civilian and military—to wage irregular warfare, but are now demonstrating a growing willingness to deploy their own forces to undermine U.S. allies and partners in a bid to displace the U.S.-led international order.
This troubling development was demonstrated most dramatically in Ukraine in the lead up to the 2022 full-scale invasion, where Russian forces fought alongside proxy separatists and set the stage for their later escalation to a conventional invasion.
The United States is not currently ready for this irregular fight. If the United States hopes to prevail in this asymmetrical world war, it must upgrade its abilities to provide self-defense and resistance support to its allies and partners, and better coordinate its disparate efforts to counter Russia and China across departments and agencies.
A failure to do so could spell disaster for close U.S. partners facing similar threats as Ukraine, such as Taiwan. Smart U.S. irregular and special operations support to Ukraine over the 2014-2022 period offers an all-too-rare template to get it right.

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