The solution involves realistic goals, trust building, and the willingness to walk away.
After the rose-colored summit in Singapore between U. S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, reality is starting to set in. During meetings with North Korean leadership in Pyongyang, U. S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was accused by Kim’s minions of using “gangster-like” tactics. This controversy was preceded by news that North Korea is ramping up its missile production.
The actual Korean word leveled against Pompeo better-translates into English as “robber,” meaning that North Korea believes the United States is demanding that Kim give up his crown-jewels — nuclear weapons — immediately, and before the U. S. has provided any concessions. The Trump administration, of course, fears making the same mistake as its predecessors: Providing concessions and economic aid only to watch the North Koreans walk away without fulfilling their end of the bargain. In other words, mutual trust remains low.
But there is an even bigger hurdle faced by the Trump administration. North Korea denuclearizing was always highly unlikely, but any meaningful deal between North Korea and the U. S. that leads to better relations — even just securing stockpiles and reduced quantities of missiles — is likely to be hindered by China. For a time, Beijing cooperated with America’s “maximum pressure” sanctions. But now China is loosening enforcement at the North Korean-Chinese border and granting the Kim regime much-needed access to foreign currency. This strengthens North Korea’s negotiating position against America.
Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) made a similar point in a Sunday morning interview, where he claimed that China’s renewed aid to the Kim regime was a negotiating chip in Beijing’s trade dispute with the United States. Trump followed up on Monday with a tweet that echoed Graham’s sentiment. But Trump and Graham are only half right. There is more to the story than the Sino-American trade dispute, and in search of a workaround to China’s loosening of sanctions, it is important to fully understand why Beijing is log-jamming.
Chinese Easing of Sanctions on North Korea Isn’t About Trade
The real driving force behind China’s overtures to Pyongyang has to do with China’s fear of a unified Korean Peninsula, or of a non-isolated North Korea that has working relations with China’s strategic adversaries, especially the United States. This has nothing to do with the trade dispute. In fact, trade tensions were subdued when China was cooperating on North Korea, and China stopped implementing “maximum pressure” before Sino-American trade relations subsequently deteriorated.
Just look at the timeline, starting right before the Singapore summit was about to take place: Strict penalties on ZTE — a Chinese telecommunications company that disregarded U. S. sanctions on Iran — were being rolled back by the White House. In exchange for ZTE’s pardon — and in a bid to hold off U. S. tariffs — China’s regulators promised to approve a merger they had been holding up between NXP Semiconductors and Qualcomm, China made a vague promise to purchase more American agriculture products and natural gas, and China reduced tariffs on U. S. auto imports from 25 percent to 15 percent. China didn’t budge on its Made in China 2025 industrial policy and forced technology transfer, but there was progress.
That détente was short-lived. Immediately after the Singapore summit took place, China signaled it would ease back “maximum pressure” on North Korea.
