Despite questions, the agreement should be welcomed – including by the U. S.
At the Pyongyang summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and South Korean President Moon Jae-in, held from September 18-20,2018, a declaration was signed by the ranking military officials of the two Koreas. This agreement is intended to prevent military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula. Specifically it establishes buffer zones, based on the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) (a.k.a. the Armistice Line) on land, and on the Northern Limit Line (NLL) at sea. Optimists see the agreement as a useful step toward better relations; pessimists see it as a step too far, given the continuing military tensions on the Korean Peninsula. A balanced appraisal suggests that it is too soon to decide.
This is not the first time that the two Koreas have reached agreement on military issues since the Armistice Agreement on July 27,1953, which implemented a ceasefire in the Korean War. The most important are the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation (a.k.a. the Basic Agreement), and the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, both signed in 1991. This new agreement is more comprehensive, however, and includes substantive measures that should allow the effective de-escalation of tactical and operational contingencies between the two Korean militaries.
Details of the 9/19 Military Agreement
The previous inter-Korean summits, in April and May 2018, were primarily concerned with political matters, but at the latest summit the main emphasis was on military issues.
Both Koreas made notable concessions affecting their current combat readiness in all three battlespaces: land, sea, and air. They have committed to establishing so-called peace zones near the NLL and the MDL, without any military withdrawals or redeployment of troops from either side. Within these new buffer zones, live-fire artillery drills, major maneuvers, and new weapons will not be permitted; there will also be no-fly zones, including for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and joint fishing areas crossing the NLL. The existing Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) stretches for 2 kilometers on either side of the MDL; the new buffer zones will extend to 5 km. The peace areas based on the NLL will reach 135 km. Near the DMZ, the no-fly zone for helicopters will be 10 km, for UAVs 15 km, and for fixed-wing aircraft 20 km on the eastern and 40 km on the western frontlines.
To support these peace zones there are new rules of engagement applicable to both militaries. Moreover, several previously agreed-upon measures will also be implemented or reactivated, including: establishing a Joint North-South Military Committee, membership to be determined according to the Basic Agreement of 1991; connecting high-level hotlines as agreed in the Joint Statement of 1974; disarming security guards in the Joint Security Areas; and allowing mutual use of the Han River Estuary, in accordance with the Armistice Agreement signed of 1953. Both sides will also withdraw a number of guard posts.
Finally, the two Koreas will work together to recover human remains and will concurrently clear landmines near the DMZ. They will construct roads for these purposes, thereby providing direct logistics and communications between the Koreas for the first time.
Reaction to the 9/19 Military Agreement
Conservative opinion in South Korea has criticized the agreement for several reasons. Some, stuck in a Cold War mentality, believe that North Korea is still planning a military invasion of the South, meaning the agreement is mere subterfuge. Others complain that it unfairly treats Pyongyang and Seoul on equal terms, as if the history of lethal military provocations by the North is somehow equivalent to the verbal hostility sometimes expressed by the South, and that both are equally guilty of escalating military tensions. Another objection concerns the future of the longstanding U. S.-ROK alliance: Pyongyang has always sought to drive a wedge between Seoul and Washington, and right now there is a huge gap between U. S. and South Korean perceptions of North Korean intentions.
