U. S. and Chinese experts weigh in.
With Trump taking control of the White House, the North Korean nuclear game has entered another round. On the U. S. side, the Obama administration’s “strategic patience” policy is recognized as unsuccessful, but Trump seems not to have better a path toward the same goal. As for North Korea, although the DPRK has achieved a series of breakthroughs in nuclear and missile technology over the past decade, since the Six Party Talks were discontinued, its strategic situation is getting worse. In particular, Pyongyang has suffered under the most severe UN sanctions in history for almost a year. It is hard to claim that North Korea is not hurried and anxious.
Therefore, the present environment provides a good opportunity for both the DPRK and the United States to reconsider their policies and strategies. Both countries shall take care not to miss the change. Since neither side has the ability and willingness to win by force or coercion, dialogue is undoubtedly the best option. The problem is under what conditions to reopen dialogue. One of the most important factor making the reopening of dialogue difficult is that both sides set preconditions that are not acceptable to each other. The United States insists that the DPRK must promise to abandon its nuclear program in the first place, which is tantamount to forcing North Korea to accept defeat before the negotiations have even started. On the other hand, the DPRK requires that negotiations take place only under the premise of North Korea being recognized as nuclear country, in defiance of international rules.
These unreasonable negotiating conditions are not meant to truly open the grounds for dialogue. The DPRK thinks the ultimate goal of the United States is to topple its regime, while the United States believes the DPRK’s possession of nuclear weapons is not solely as a bargaining chip or self-defense tool. At the very least, the majority of public opinion holds that neither of the above suspicions can be ruled out. From my point of view, if these perceptions are the main reasons behind both sides’ preconditions over the years, before a new round of talks begins, both countries should abandon the practice of setting definitely hopeless goals. Instead they should consider the parallel track plan proposed by China.
As it contemplates what to do about North Korea, the Trump administration might be well advised to avoid the mistakes of its predecessors. After all, any new administration will have plenty of chances to make blunders of its own invention. So here, for whatever it may be worth, is a review of some of the “worst practices” of the past.
