North Korea’s May 14 test of a new solid-fuel, two-stage ballistic missile achieved and possibly surpassed Pyongyang’s expectations. It also conveyed unambiguous signals of strategic intent.
North Korea’s May 14 test of a new two-stage mobile ballistic missile achieved and possibly surpassed Pyongyang’s expectations. It also conveyed unambiguous signals of strategic intent. The test should disabuse all other powers of any lingering belief that Pyongyang is prepared to negotiate an end to its pursuit of nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver them. It also demonstrates the North’s capacity for carefully calibrating the potential risks to its security that additional testing entails, an ability that external observers seldom acknowledge.
The latest test has also, once again, directly undermined China’s long-stated belief that it can somehow nudge Pyongyang toward a more flexible policy stance, which the Chinese calculate would require the United States to undertake parallel diplomatic steps. Beijing even extended a last-minute invitation for North Korea to participate in China’s One Belt, One Road Forum earlier this week—the showpiece endeavor of Chinese President Xi Jinping. But the early morning missile launch—only hours before the opening of the forum—constituted another act of defiance by Pyongyang and caused President Xi to lose face.
The missile test was an equal source of consternation for Moon Jae-in, the newly elected president of the Republic of Korea, who pledged during his campaign to resume economic and political engagement with the North that had been shelved under former President Park Geun-hye. The prospects for an early renewal of the Sunshine Policy or any attempt to reverse the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) decision are now decidedly unpropitious.
Despite periods of acute tension between the United States and the North, deterrence has been maintained on the Korean Peninsula since the armistice of 1953. For half a century, Pyongyang did not possess even a rudimentary nuclear weapons capability, yet the United States never retaliated for egregious actions by the North, including the seizure of the USS Pueblo in 1968 and the shoot-down of a US EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft over the Sea of Japan in 1969, resulting in the death of all 31 Americans on board.
However, for all its bluster and bravado, Pyongyang is not oblivious to the risks posed by additional nuclear and missile tests. It is keenly aware of widespread expectations in the United States that Pyongyang is nearing the test of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) , and that many American officials (including President Trump) deem this prospect wholly unacceptable to vital U. S. interests. The United States has also warned North Korea not to undertake a sixth nuclear weapons test, leading to unsubstantiated claims that the United States was preparing to attack the nuclear test site to prevent such a test.
Neither of these outcomes occurred during the March-April period when the major annual U. S.-Korean military exercises were underway. Pyongyang has instead opted for actions less overtly challenging than an ICBM test—but still very worrisome.
