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North Korea analysis often devolves to predicting when the next provocation will occur and then endlessly debating the “signal” that the regime was – or was not – sending to Washington.
Lost in the analytic morass is that the “what” is more important than the “when” or “why.” The next nuclear test, in addition to being another serious violation of United Nations resolutions, would indicate that Pyongyang has developed an improved generation of tactical nuclear weapons to use against U.S. forces and allies in northeast Asia.
The latest iteration in this speculative cycle is over the long-awaited seventh North Korea nuclear test. Since March, Washington and Seoul have declared that Pyongyang had completed all necessary preparations and that the nuclear test was “imminent.” Usually that would mean the nuclear device had been emplaced and the tunnel packed to contain the blast. Launch would be expected within days.
The nuclear test was first expected during two major North Korean anniversaries in April, then during President Biden’s May trip to Asia, and now during the first major U.S.-South Korean military exercises in four years. Pyongyang’s failure to live up to our predictions generated speculation of technical difficulties with the weapon or the regime not wanting to anger Beijing in the runup to the Chinese party congress later this year.
