Edward Howell writes that Pyongyang’s weapons are not going anywhere for now, so long as the gap remains in how the North and Washington define denuclearisation
Nobody was surprised when, on November 16, the ruling Workers Party of Korea announced that Kim Jong-un had “supervised a newly developed ultra-modern tactical weapon test”.
The North deems itself to be a full-fledged nuclear power. A “tactical” test of an unidentified weapon reinforces the fact that the North’s nuclear weapons are not going anywhere for now, so long as the gap remains in how Pyongyang and Washington (and its allies) define denuclearisation.
While incremental movement in inter-Korean relations through economic cooperation may have been unimaginable one year ago, cautious optimism is key.
We should not expect assisting Pyongyang’s economic development to lead to nuclear concessions easily; the heart of the North’s byungjin policy is parallel nuclear and economic development. Moreover, we should not forget the power of alliances, particularly between Beijing and Pyongyang, which, while frosty at times, is of critical importance in keeping the status quo situation on the Korean peninsula.
Two of the many obstacles for progress on the North Korean nuclear issue must not go unnoticed. The first, which sceptics of any improvement on the Korean peninsula are right to stress, is the stringency of UN Security Council economic sanctions, particularly those that restrict economic engagement with the North. Pyongyang and Beijing have sounded many calls for their easing, yet Washington has refused to give leeway. Yet, is the damage of sanctions enough to warrant the North to concede on the “icing on the cake” that is its nuclear programme, essential to its self-perception as a nuclear power?
Second is the impasse in which the global community has been embedded since Pyongyang’s rhetorical – but so far, not visible – pledge towards denuclearisation took hold. What is meant by “denuclearisation”? The Trump administration’s North Korean policy has emphasised complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement, but the idea of complete denuclearisation was also reiterated by then secretary of state Hillary Clinton in 2009, when she said sanctions would continue unless “verifiable and irreversible” steps towards disarmament were taken.
Although the latter remark was made under the Obama administration’s unsuccessful waiting game of “strategic patience”, is the current US administration’s “maximum pressure” more successful? Washington’s line is clear: the North’s nuclear weapons must go, and the international community must receive a declaration of Pyongyang’s nuclear stockpiles before any substantive concessions can be made. Anything short of this is not US-defined “denuclearisation”.
For Pyongyang, denuclearisation means the removal of the US security guarantee over its ally south of the 38th parallel, which may include the removal (or at least a significant reduction) in the presence of US troops in the South, though the latter has been dropped as an explicit condition by Pyongyang.
