Overall it would be unwise to interpret North Korea’s overtures at Hanoi as demonstrating a sincere commitment to denuclearization.
The second U. S.-North Korea summit was a bust, with Kim and Trump leaving Hanoi without any mutual concessions or even a joint statement. In a post-mortem press conference Trump stated that the sticking point was sanctions: “Basically they wanted the sanctions lifted in their entirety, and we couldn’t do that. They were willing to de-nuke a large portion of the areas that we wanted, but we couldn’t give up all of the sanctions for that”. Importantly, according to Trump, North Korea was willing to denuclearize some ‘areas’ but not others of interest to the U. S.: “They wanted sanctions lifted but they weren’t willing to do [denucleazise] an area we wanted. They were willing to give us areas but not the ones we wanted.… he [Kim] wants to just do [denuclearize] areas that are less important than the areas that we want.”
In a press conference of their own North Korea clarified their negotiating position, stating that they only sought the removal of five UN sanctions resolutions adopted in 2016 and 2017, and that the ‘area’ that they were willing to verifiably denuclearize in exchange for this was its Yongbyon facility: “We will permanently and completely dismantle all the nuclear material production facilities in the Yongbyon area, including plutonium and uranium, in the presence of U. S. experts and by the joint work of technicians from both countries.” They also added that they were willing “to make commitments on a permanent halt of nuclear testing and long-range rocket launch tests … in order to lower the concerns of the United States.”
If we assume that both statements are accurate (inconsistencies regarding the levels of sanctions relief notwithstanding) and sincere, we can draw the following conclusions: (1) North Korea is willing to give up its Yongbyon facility; (2) North Korea is willing to forgo additional nuclear and missile tests; and (3) the U. S. fears the existence of other critical nuclear weapons sites outside of Yongbyon. From a technical perspective, all three of these conclusions offer insight into the state of North Korea’s current nuclear weapons capabilities.
First and foremost, North Korea’s willingness to forfeit Yongbyon is significant. Yongbyon has historically been the centre of the North Korean nuclear enterprise. It includes North Korea’s only operational 5 MWe reactor and its near-operational light water reactor, both responsible for producing plutonium; it’s chemical reprocessing facility necessary for turning that plutonium into a form useable in bombs; and its only confirmed uranium enrichment facility responsible for producing highly enriched uranium. To “permanently and completely dismantle all the nuclear material production facilities in the Yongbyon area” would therefore, ostensibly, cut off any further production of fissile material – the essential component of a fission bomb.
Like many others I do not believe that North Korea is sincere about giving up its nuclear weapons, and cynically view North Korean denuclearization overtures as tools to milk concession from Washington. Taking this view, North Korea’s willingness to give up fissile material production at Yongbyon is telling.
