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If the first few weeks of 2018 are any guide, it is going to be a tumultuous, confrontational year for America’s foreign relations. Washington’s intentions are likely to reach a state of near nakedness, and so will be a lot easier to discern. To say what we are likely to see is going to be unpretty is to put the point far too mildly.
I termed the United States a “spoiler” in a recent column. By this I mean it appears determined to maintain a state of high tension, if not severe disorder and open conflict or the danger of it, in a variety of global circumstances. Spoil what, you may ask. The answer is almost too bitter to write. Just as sound prospects for negotiated settlements arise in the several cases I will write of here, Washington appears determined to prevent any such successes. This ugly contradiction is already stark and is likely to grow starker.
I could be wrong in my prognosis, but at this moment I see little ground to invest in any such hope. Slightly more plausible is the expectation that the messes our policy cliques create or worsen in the year to come will finally cause more Americans to put our conduct abroad higher on their long lists of objections to our great nation’s direction.
The “spoiler” remark was prompted by the extraordinary events now unfolding on the Korean Peninsula. It is far, far too soon to say “Peace is at hand,” but North and South have taken a couple of small steps on a path to a peaceful settlement as promising as any we have seen in at least a couple of decades. After a brief but worrisome silence, the U. S. appeared perfectly prepared to make sure Seoul and Pyongyang do not get very far. I wrote of this in last week’s column.
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Now there is more from Washington in this line — as there has been this past week elsewhere. Let us line up these developments and see what we can surmise when we consider them side by side:
There are three things to note about this round. One, they are unilateral, as are three previous sets. This suggests that the administration may now be isolating itself at the UN by timing new sanctions just as Seoul and Pyongyang begin new contacts the rest of the world wants to see develop. Two, Washington now insists that China and Russia begin expelling various North Korean officials. In my read, the likely objective here is to split Beijing and Moscow from the two other capitals — Seoul and Tokyo — long associated with efforts toward a settlement. Moscow and Beijing, let us not forget, have been actively working with Moon Jae-in’s administration in Seoul to develop workable diplomatic and economic solutions.
Three, and most important, we must ask whether the administration is trying to provoke Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader, into another missile test, thereby providing an excuse to move militarily.
