Edward Howell writes that for now, diplomacy may not be sufficient to advance the effort to compel North Korea to rein in its nuclear ambitionsWith three out of the five permanent UN Security Council members unwilling to budge, Washington or Pyongyang may need to act
As Washington and Pyongyang continue their game of stalemate, could dramatic concessions be on the horizon?
North Korea’s claim that “America does not even belch after swallowing a whole chicken” seems bizarre; but Pyongyang’s logic is clear. Washington must make a move, if the stagnant progress in the North Korean nuclear issue is to gain any traction on the part of Pyongyang.
Early October saw the fourth visit of US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to the hermit state, a visit heralded by North Korean state media as featuring “productive and wonderful talks”. Only two weeks later, Pyongyang treated the world to a 1,600 word essay criticising Washington for “responding to good faith with evil”.
The statement polemically denounced the “ill-boding remarks” from the US, namely the “stereo-typed words” of the US State Department that “sanctions must be continued until denuclearisation is realised”.
This action seems to contrast with the performative diplomacy that has characterised US-North Korean relations this year. But it shows clearly that Pyongyang will only make a move once it gets what it wants. Both sides expect something that the other will not give, which only points to continuing stagnation vis-à-vis seeing any progress on the international menace that is North Korea.
Two conflicting dynamics seem to be at work. First, dialogue – inter-Korean, and between Washington and Pyongyang – and secondly, the simultaneous pursuit of a policy remarkably similar to “maximum pressure”, just not in name, on the part of the US.
Even though the policy in name may seem to have died at the end of April this year, it also seems to live on in a somewhat sporadic afterlife.
Dealing with North Korea is a highly complex game of perception and misperception in international politics. If Pyongyang perceives that Washington will insist on a declaration of its nuclear arsenal and denuclearisation on Washington’s terms – as a condition for economic gains – North Korea, too, can insist on something that it knows Washington will not give: sanctions relief and a declaration to end the Korean war.
