Домой GRASP/Korea China, Russia, and US Sanctions on North Korea

China, Russia, and US Sanctions on North Korea

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Insight from Sharyl Cross.
Trans-Pacific View author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U. S. Asia policy. This conversation with Dr. Sharyl Cross – director of the Kozmetsky Center at St. Edward’s University and co-author of the recent book China, Russia, and Twenty First Century Global Geopolitics – is the 163rd in “The Trans-Pacific Insight Series.”
Explain China and Russia’s support for lifting sanctions on North Korea.
China and Russia share an interest in limiting North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and avoiding a military confrontation or collapse of the regime in Pyongyang. However, both Beijing and Moscow consider the U. S. condition of full denuclearization of the DPRK unrealistic as a requirement for relaxing sanctions.
Both countries were pleased to see the de-escalation of tensions from threats of “fire and fury” and repeated missile launches following the unprecedented summit of U. S. President Donald Trump with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in June 2018 in Singapore. Beijing and Moscow could support a Trump administration brokered agreement to halt North Korea’s nuclear missile launches with reciprocal suspensions in routine U. S.-South Korean military drills.
However, China and Russia working in unison called for the UN Security Council to ease sanctions on North Korea in September 2018 as a means of rewarding initial steps toward disarmament. This position advanced by China and Russia directly contradicts the Trump administration and U. S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo insisting that sanctions must remain firmly in place until denuclearization of the DPRK has been achieved and verified. As the threat of a U. S.-North Korean military clash recedes, there is less urgency and resolve in strict enforcement of sanctions, which was never the preferred method in dealing with North Korea for either Beijing or Moscow.
What is the strategic calculus behind China and Russia’s resistance to the U. S. proposal to maintain strict sanctions?
While both nations would place a high priority on avoiding escalation of a military conflict over North Korea, China and Russia have demonstrated a willingness to challenge U. S. positions on regional conflict flashpoints. Beijing was the target of additional tariffs imposed by the Trump administration in fall 2018, and Moscow suffered another round of more stringent Western economic sanctions in August 2018 originally imposed by the United States and its allies following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, perhaps making it even more difficult for Washington to enlist continued China-Russia support for maintaining a punitive sanctions regime on Pyongyang. Both China and Russia find common ground in supporting a multipolar world order to counter perceived U. S. unilateralism and would want to avoid sending the message at home or abroad that they were yielding leadership on North Korea to the United States.
The most recent round of trilateral talks held among officials of China, Russia, and North Korea reinforces the message that not all decisions will be made in Washington. On October 9,2018, following the latest visit of U. S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to North Korea, deputy foreign ministers of Russia, China, and North Korea — Igor Morgulov of Russia, Kong Xuanyou of China, and Choe Son Hui of North Korea— gathered for the first time in Moscow to discuss easing sanctions on North Korea. Summarizing the meetings, Morgulov, stated in a TASS interview that “measures” should reflect “reciprocity, and parallel, synchronous and gradual steps” and emphasized that the situation on the Korean Peninsula would be settled in “accordance with the Russian-Chinese roadmap.”
Both China and Russia are pursuing policies toward North Korea reflecting respective national interests. China, North Korea’s largest economic patron, shares ideological commitments with the DPRK but would also like to see the country implement economic reforms based on the successful Chinese model. Moscow recognizes that North Korea could be a factor in realizing regional economic project plans and long-term development of Russia’s Far East.

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