Having the U. S. deploy nuclear weapons near North Korea would deter that regime from using its nukes.
To the editor: Doug Bandow’s belief that “a package of benefits” could entice North Korea to denuclearize is belied by history. (“ If Trump wants China to ‘solve the North Korea problem, ‘ he has to cater to Beijing’s interests, ” Opinion July 7)
Washington offered enticements in the past, commencing with the Clinton administration’s Agreed Framework in 1994. Each time, Pyongyang failed to uphold its end of the bargain. The reason: North Korea associates nuclear weapons with security, just as all nuclear-armed nations do.
The challenge is how best to assure that Kim Jong Un’s regime never uses the arsenal. A three-prong containment strategy would include the following:
First, enhance deterrence by bringing U. S. nuclear weapons back to South Korea. If this is politically impossible, bolster U. S. capacity offshore and declare that the Kim regime would cease to exist were it to use the bomb.
Second, promote confidence-building measures to reduce the risk of war. This should include normalization of relations to promote communication.
