The U.S. can win the competition against Beijing only by making it multilateral.
In its contest with China, America has a geographical problem: Its most powerful block of allies, the NATO countries, are on the other side of the world. That has led to a transatlantic awkwardness in dealing with China, and it’s triggering debate on how European countries can best defend the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region. What’s tricky is that the militarily sensible answer is not the strategically astute one. America’s NATO allies cannot save the day militarily in the Indo-Pacific. But they can do something more important: help Washington turn a bilateral confrontation with China into a multilateral one. Although the U.S.-China competition is centered in the Indo-Pacific, Europe will play a crucial role. NATO’s European members still represent the world’s largest concentration of advanced democracies and its most economically and militarily formidable cluster of U.S. allies. But because most European countries are located so far from the frontlines, they have been relatively slow to awaken to the Chinese threat. This asymmetry has produced some glaring divergences, such as when the European Union concluded a Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with Beijing just as President Joe Biden was taking office. Fortunately, European policies seem to be headed in the right direction, albeit gradually, even if the rhetoric of leaders such as Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron is more equivocal. Since early 2020, several European countries have made it harder for Huawei to build their 5G telecommunications networks. The EU sanctioned Beijing over its atrocities in Xinjiang earlier this year, evoking a furious Chinese response that has left the CAI in jeopardy. Perhaps most interesting, several key U.S. allies are showing more interest in Indo-Pacific defense. France recently led naval exercises with the Quad — America, Australia, India and Japan — in the Bay of Bengal.
