Tensions are rising in the South China Sea.
Last August, regional observer Collin Koh Swee Lean at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore compared the South China Sea to a “ pot of soup on low boil.” Developments in September and early October 2018 suggested that the surface tension in the pot would soon erupt into a boil. Current dynamics in the South China Sea pose critical policy implications for all parties who are stakeholders in regional security.
The U. S. Navy conducted its twelfth publicized freedom of navigation operational patrol or FONOP in the South China Sea in late-September. This was the eight operational assertion under the Trump administration. The USS Decatur sailed within 12 nautical miles of Gaven and Johnson reefs in Spratly islands. It is likely the USS Decatur conducted an innocent passage.
In response, China dispatched a Luyang -class destroyer to confront the USS Decatur. The Chinese destroyer closed to within 45 yards of the USS Decatur’s bow. The USS Decatur had to conduct an emergency maneuver to avoid a collision. Washington described the engagement as “an unsafe and unprofessional maneuver” and “reckless harassment.” Vice President Mike Pence pointedly asserted a few days after the incident that the U. S. “will not be intimidated” and “will not stand down.”
China’s response to the operation by the USS Decatur was unprecedented. As Carlyle Thayer observed, this was the first time China’s actions posed a real risk of an accident with a U. S. naval ship conducting a FONOP. In previous FONOPs, China deployed military ships to shadow and protest the operations of U. S. naval ships from a safe distance. Bonnie Glaser postulated there was a change to China’s rules of engagement by the Central Military Commission headed by Chinese top leader Xi Jinping.
Thayer and Glaser both agreed that China’s reaction to the latest operation should be seen in a larger context of bilateral economic and diplomatic tensions, of which most notable are U. S. import tariffs on China and recent U. S. arms sales to Taiwan. Additional factors include the increased frequency of U. S. continuous bomber presence patrols (for example, the deployment of B-52 Stratofortress heavy bombers in late September), the withdrawal of an invitation for China to participate in the 2018 RIMPAC military exercise, U. S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis ’ cancellation of a planned trip to China, and the increased presence of external maritime powers like the U. K., France, Japan, Canada and others in the South China Sea.
Southeast Asian states are likely to hold their breath to observe what will happen next in the South China Sea after the Decatur incident and the sharp exchange of words between Washington and Beijing. This raises some intriguing questions: How will the U. S. react to China’s increased aggressiveness in the South China Sea? What will the other major powers do, given their increased operational presence in the area? Will China declare an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea as rumored for some time? And what should ASEAN and its members do to contribute to regional peace and stability?
Washington continues to enhance its military presence in the South China Sea.
